

**SECRET**

DD/A Registry

77-5363

Executive Registry

77-52092

26 SEP 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA: General Counsel  
FROM:   
Acting Director of Security  
SUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information  
Policy (U)  
REFERENCE: Memo to DCI from D/NSA dtd 22 July 1977,  
same subject


1. ☐ Action Requested: It is recommended that you sign the attached revised reply to the 22 July 1977 memorandum from the Director, National Security Agency. It accentuates the need for centralized oversight of the national systems of compartmentation, SI, T/K and

2. ☐ Background: As a practical matter, all NSA employees require Special Intelligence access approvals. The memorandum from the Director, NSA, appears to be simply a pro forma statement for the record on his responsibilities and authority. Although the instant correspondence is not the place to debate this issue, nevertheless it is necessary to accent the need for stronger central direction of the compartmented systems.

☐ The evolution of the national systems provides some insight into the degree of acceptance which such central control will meet.

☐ The TALENT-KEYHOLE,  and COMINT control systems came into being at different times and with individual sets of ground rules. The COMINT control system was instituted in World War II by agreement between U. S. and British military COMINT organizations. It was continued

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(S) The T/K security system was established in 1960 by Presidential memorandum, and the DCI was thereby charged with maintaining and reviewing the control roster. The CIA was charged with establishing security policy for a national program in 1962, by agreement between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the DCI, and the [ ] control system was established for that purpose.

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(S) While it is clear, therefore, that the DCI is the policy authority for the T/K and [ ] systems, his position vis-a-vis the COMINT system is not so straightforward. It could be argued that the system existed before the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which created the DCI, and that traditionally the individual departments and agencies have had a high degree of autonomy in their implementation of the system.

(C) The National Security Act of 1947 and the provisions of NSCID No. 1 that the DCI shall develop and review security standards and practices and that he shall make surveys of intelligence activities in order to advise the National Security Council and coordinate the U. S. intelligence effort would seem to provide a basis for DCI leadership in the operation of all the compartmented systems. Executive Order 11905 may provide even further underpinning to the effort to strengthen central control.

3. (C) Recommendation: It is recommended that the accompanying memorandum to the Director, NSA be sent. It asserts the authority of the DCI to the degree necessary without forcing a confrontation.

Att



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77-5209/3

Jed/Tony/etc

8 OCT 1977

1. I'll just not reply
2. Your letter to him  
open up TR as well as Comint -  
I certainly don't intend to do  
that & have no authority  
to stop him
3. I don't agree that  
100% of the people need  
Comint & just see no  
excuse for the increase  
he plans - but will  
want to fight the  
bureaucratic issue of  
who's in charge
4. Undoubtedly it is my  
military blood that is being at  
memoranda

25X1


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Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002000100007-5

SUBJECT: Director of Central Intelligence  
Sensitive Compartmented Information Policy (U)

CONCURRENCE:

25X1



Anthony A. Lapham  
General Counsel

28 September 1977

Date

Distribution:

Orig - Adse  
1 - ER  
1 - A/DDCI  
1 - OGC  
1 - ADDA  
1 - AD/Security

\*My views on this matter are set forth in a memorandum that I sent to the Acting D/DCI/IC dated 11 August, copy attached. The response to D/NSA proposed by the Acting Director of Security is consistent with those views, and I therefore concur in that response.

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ATTACHMENT

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77-5209/A

*Dec did not sign*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information Policy (U)

1. (C) This will acknowledge your memorandum of 22 July 1977 wherein you express your concern that my desire to stabilize the current level of COMINT access approvals might adversely affect the operation of NSA.

2. (C) My effort to bring the access approvals for all categories of sensitive compartmented information under a unified system of oversight is predicated upon the concern for which you expressed recognition and support in your memorandum. I recognize that, as a practical matter, all staff personnel of the National Security Agency require Special Intelligence access approvals and I certainly never wanted it inferred that I was seeking to impose a personnel ceiling upon NSA through a clearance limitation.

25X1 3. (C) I believe, however, that proper management of national systems of compartmentation requires that accounting for the numbers of related access approvals should be done in a centralized manner. I expect that NSA, like all other intelligence community agencies, will provide the information necessary to accomplish this end. I also expect that NSA, like the rest of the community will review and attempt to reduce the numbers of TK and [ ] approvals required by staff personnel, and carefully scrutinize the levels of all access approvals held by contractor personnel with the objective of reduction wherever possible.

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(effective date or event, if any)

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4. (U) Your expressed support of my policy of limiting access to sensitive compartmented information is appreciated, and I look forward to your cooperation in the community-wide effort to effect greater control of such access. I should like to point out that my letter to the Acting Deputy for the Intelligence Community encompassed several actions affecting the security of sensitive programs and products, all of which I consider to be equally important as the limitations of access approvals.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Distribution:

Orig - Adse  
1 - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
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1 - AD/Security

ORIGINATOR:



Acting Director of Security

26 SEP 1977

Date

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

OGC 77-6105

Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002000100007-5

T: (Optional)

Director of Central Intelligence  
Sensitive Compartmented Information Policy (U)STAT  
STAT

Acting Director of Security

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

26 SEP 1977

Officer designation, room number, and

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALSCOMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom  
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

General Counsel

9/28

ad.m

SIGNATURE

RESPONSE TO  
22 July MEMOFROM ADMIRAL  
INMAN.

DDA

29 SEP 1977

ly

DDCI

30 SEP 1977

B)

DCI

Rec'd  
30 Sept. 3 OCT 1977

DJ/amy

20001

McBlake

NSH